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Abstract
Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge and
belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based
approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008).
By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in un-
awareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of
unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and
epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is characterized behaviorally as the event
being null and its negation being null.
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1 Introduction
Unawareness refers to the lack of conception rather than the lack of information. There
is a fundamental difference between not knowing about which events obtain and the
inability to conceive of some events. Unawareness is an interdisciplinary topic that fas-
cinates economists, computer scientists, logicians, and philosophers alike. Traditionally,
computer scientists, logicians and philosophers are interested in epistemic models while
most economists are mainly interested in the behavioral implications. In the literature,
unawareness has been defined epistemically using syntactic and semantic approaches.1
While epistemic characterizations are conceptually insightful, the behavioral content of
unawareness is less clear. Can unawareness be characterized behaviorally?
A first attempt to answer this question is presented in Schipper (2012). There we ap-
ply the lattice state-space structure of Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2013) to
the Anscombe-Aumann approach to subjective utility theory and characterize awareness-
dependent subjective expected utility. This framework allows us to distinguish unaware-
ness of an event from the event being Savage null and thus we are able to show behavioral
implications of unawareness. Yet, our approach in Schipper (2012) has many shortcom-
ings. For instance, as in almost any decision theoretic framework, we consider states
of nature rather than states of the world. That is, states describe just lists of physical
events but are silent on the state of mind of the decision maker. While such an approach
is sensible in a purely decision theoretic framework, where bets are placed on physical
events rather than (higher order) beliefs of some players, it does not allow for character-
izing behaviorally - at least in principle - the intricate epistemic properties of knowledge
and awareness across the lattice structure introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper
(2006, 2008). For instance, introspection of knowledge requires bets on events in which
the decision maker knows an event.
Morris (1996, 1997) showed for standard state-spaces with states of the world that
properties of knowledge and belief can be - at least in principle - characterized behav-
iorally. In this paper, we extend his approach to unawareness structures and show how
to characterize behaviorally properties of the possibility correspondence introduced in
Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006). Moreover, we show how to characterize preference-
based operators of knowledge, awareness, and unawareness.
This work is directly related to a growing literature on unawareness. Heifetz, Meier,
and Schipper (2006, 2008, 2013) introduced a syntax-free semantics of unawareness using
state-spaces familiar to economists, decision theorists, and game theorists. Apart from
having a syntax-free semantics, Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006, 2008) generalize
Modica and Rustichini (1999) to the multi-agent case. The precise connection between
Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006) on one hand and Modica and Rustichini (1999)
and earlier work in computer science by Fagin and Halpern (1988) on the other hand is
understood from Halpern (2001), Halpern and Reˆgo (2008, 2012), and Heifetz, Meier, and
1For a bibliography see http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/schipper/unaw.htm
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Schipper (2008). Galanis (2012) relaxes some properties of the possibility correspondence
in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006). The connection between Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper (2006, 2008) and Galanis (2012) is explored in Galanis (2011). Li (2009) presents
an alternative to modeling unawareness in the single-agent case. Heinsalu (2012) explores
the connection between Li (2009) and the rest of the literature. Finally, Feinberg (2012)
presents an approach of modeling unawareness in the context of games. The precise
connection between Feinberg (2012) and the rest of the literature is yet to be explored.
The literature addressed also awareness of unawareness, see Board and Chung (2011),
Halpern and Reˆgo (2009, 2012a), Sillari (2008), A˚gotnes and Alechina (2007), and Walker
(2013). The relationship between Board and Chung (2011) and Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper (2006) is studied in Board, Chung, and Schipper (2011). The relationship
between Halpern and Rego (2009, 2012a) and Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006) is
explored in Halpern and Rego (2012a). See Section 4 for further discussions of the
related literature.
In the next section we provide a brief exposition of unawareness structures and review
properties of knowledge and awareness. In Section 3 we introduce the decision theoretic
framework and provide the results. We conclude with a discussion in Section 4. Proofs
are collected in the appendix.
2 Unawareness Structures
2.1 State-Spaces
Let S = {Sα}α∈A be a finite lattice of disjoint state-spaces, with the partial order  on S.
For simplicity we assume in this paper that each S is finite. If Sα and Sβ are such that
Sα  Sβ we say that “Sα is more expressive than Sβ – states of Sα describe situations
with a richer vocabulary than states of Sβ ”.
2 Denote by Ω =
⋃
α∈A
Sα the disjoint union
of these spaces.
Spaces in the lattice can be more or less “rich” in terms of facts that may or may not
obtain in them. The partial order relates to the “richness” of spaces. The upmost space
of the lattice may be interpreted as the “objective” state-space. Its states encompass full
descriptions.
2.2 Projections
For every S and S ′ such that S ′  S, there is a surjective projection rS
′
S : S
′ → S,
where rSS is the identity. (“r
S′
S (ω) is the restriction of the description ω to the more
limited vocabulary of S.”) Note that the cardinality of S is smaller than or equal to
2Here and in what follows, phrases within quotation marks hint at intended interpretations, but we
emphasize that these interpretations are not part of the definition of the set-theoretic structure.
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the cardinality of S ′. We require the projections to commute: If S ′′  S ′  S then
rS
′′
S = r
S′
S ◦ r
S′′
S′ . If ω ∈ S
′, denote ωS = r
S′
S (ω). If D ⊆ S
′, denote DS = {ωS : ω ∈ D}.
Projections “translate” states in “more expressive” spaces to states in “less expres-
sive” spaces by “erasing” facts that can not be expressed in a lower space.
These surjective projections may embody Savage’s idea that “(i)t may be well, how-
ever, to emphasize that a state of the smaller world corresponds not to a state of the
larger, but to a set of states” (Savage, 1954, p. 9).
2.3 Events
Denote g(S) = {S ′ : S ′  S}. For D ⊆ S, denote D↑ =
⋃
S′∈g(S)
(
rS
′
S
)−1
(D). (“All the
extensions of descriptions in D to at least as expressive vocabularies.”)
An event is a pair (E, S), where E = D↑ with D ⊆ S, where S ∈ S. D is called
the base and S the base-space of (E, S), denoted by S(E). If E 6= ∅, then S is uniquely
determined by E and, abusing notation, we write E for (E, S). Otherwise, we write ∅S
for (∅, S). Note that not every subset of Ω is an event.
Some fact may obtain in a subset of a space. Then this fact should be also “express-
ible” in “more expressive” spaces. Therefore the event contains not only the particular
subset but also its inverse images in “more expressive” spaces.
Let Σ be the set of events of Ω. Note that unless S is a singleton, Σ is not an algebra
on Ω because it contains distinct vacuous events ∅S for all S ∈ S. These vacuous events
correspond to contradictions with differing “expressive power”.
2.4 Negation
If (D↑, S) is an event where D ⊆ S, the negation ¬(D↑, S) of (D↑, S) is defined by
¬(D↑, S) := ((S \D)↑, S). Note, that by this definition, the negation of a (measurable)
event is a (measurable) event. Abusing notation, we write ¬D↑ := (S \D)↑. Note that by
our notational convention, we have ¬S↑ = ∅S and ¬∅S = S↑, for each space S ∈ S. The
event ∅S should be interpreted as a “logical contradiction phrased with the expressive
power available in S.” ¬D↑ is typically a proper subset of the complement Ω \D
↑
. That
is, (S \D)↑ $ Ω \D
↑
.
Intuitively, there may be states in which the description of an event D↑ is both
expressible and true – these are the states in D↑; there may be states in which its
description is expressible but false – these are the states in ¬D↑; and there may be states
in which neither its description nor its negation are expressible – these are the states in
Ω \
(
D↑ ∪ ¬D↑
)
= Ω \ S
(
D↑
)↑
.
Thus our structure is not a standard state-space model in the sense of Dekel, Lipman,
and Rustichini (1998).
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2.5 Conjunction and Disjunction
If
{(
D↑λ, Sλ
)}
λ∈L
is a collection of events (with Dλ ⊆ Sλ, for λ ∈ L), their conjunc-
tion
∧
λ∈L
(
D↑λ, Sλ
)
is defined by
∧
λ∈L
(
D↑λ, Sλ
)
:=
((⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ
)
, supλ∈L Sλ
)
. Note,
that since S is a complete lattice, supλ∈L Sλ exists. If S = supλ∈L Sλ, then we have(⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ
)
=
(⋂
λ∈L
((
rSSλ
)−1
(Dλ)
))↑
. Again, abusing notation, we write
∧
λ∈LD
↑
λ :=⋂
λ∈LD
↑
λ (we will therefore use the conjunction symbol ∧ and the intersection symbol ∩
interchangeably).
We define the relation ⊆ between events (E, S) and (F, S ′) , by (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if
and only if E ⊆ F as sets and S ′  S. If E 6= ∅, we have that (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if and
only if E ⊆ F as sets. Note however that for E = ∅S we have (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) if and
only if S ′  S. Hence we can write E ⊆ F instead of (E, S) ⊆ (F, S ′) as long as we keep
in mind that in the case of E = ∅S we have ∅S ⊆ F if and only if S  S(F ). It follows
from these definitions that for events E and F , E ⊆ F is equivalent to ¬F ⊆ ¬E only
when E and F have the same base, i.e., S(E) = S(F ).
The disjunction of
{
D↑λ
}
λ∈L
is defined by the de Morgan law
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ = ¬
(∧
λ∈L ¬
(
D↑λ
))
.
Typically
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ $
⋃
λ∈LD
↑
λ, and if all Dλ are nonempty we have that
∨
λ∈LD
↑
λ =⋃
λ∈LD
↑
λ holds if and only if all the D
↑
λ have the same base-space. Note, that by these
definitions, the conjunction and disjunction of events is an event.
2.6 Possibility Correspondence
The set of states that a decision maker considers possible at a state is modeled by a
possibility correspondence Π : Ω −→ 2Ω that satisfies the following properties:
0. Confinement: If ω ∈ S then Π(ω) ⊆ S ′ for some S ′  S.
1. Generalized Reflexivity: ω ∈ Π↑(ω) for every ω ∈ Ω.3
2. Stationarity: ω′ ∈ Π (ω) implies Π (ω′) = Π (ω).
3. Projections Preserve Awareness: If ω ∈ S ′, ω ∈ Π(ω) and S  S ′ then ωS ∈ Π(ωS).
4. Projections Preserve Ignorance: If ω ∈ S ′ and S  S ′ then Π↑(ω) ⊆ Π↑(ωS).
5. Projections Preserve Knowledge: If S  S ′  S
′′
, ω ∈ S
′′
and Π(ω) ⊆ S ′ then
(Π(ω))S = Π(ωS).
For 5., we could have assumed ⊇ and deduce = from ⊇, 3., and the other properties.
3Here and in what follows, we abuse notation slightly and write Π↑(ω) for (Π(ω))
↑
.
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Remark 1 Generalized Reflexivity implies that if S ′  S, ω ∈ S and Π(ω) ⊆ S ′, then
rSS′(ω) ∈ Π(ω). In particular, we have Π(ω) 6= ∅, for all ω ∈ Ω.
Remark 2 Projections Preserve Ignorance and Confinement imply that if S ′  S, ω ∈ S
and Π(ωS′) ⊆ S
′′
, then Π(ω) ⊆ S∗ for some S∗ with S
′′
 S∗.
Remark 3 Projections Preserve Knowledge and Confinement imply Property 3.
Generalized Reflexivity and Stationarity are the analogues of the partitional prop-
erties of the possibility correspondence in partitional information structures. In par-
ticular, Generalized Reflexivity will yield the truth property (that what an individual
knows indeed obtains – property (iii) in Proposition 2); Stationarity will guarantee the
introspection properties (that an individual knows what she knows – property (iv) in
Proposition 2, and that an individual knows what she ignores provided she is aware of it
– Property 5. in Proposition 3).
Properties 3. to 5. of the possibility correspondence guarantee the coherence of the
knowledge and the awareness of individuals down the lattice structure. They compare
the possibility sets of an individual in a state ω and its projection ωS. The properties
guarantee that, first, at the projected state ωS the individual knows nothing she does not
know at ω, and second, at the projected state ωS the individual is not aware of anything
she is unaware of at ω (Projections Preserve Ignorance). Third, at the projected state
ωS the individual knows every event she knows at ω, provided that this event is based
in a space lower than or equal to S (Projections Preserve Knowledge). Fourth, at the
projected state ωS the individual is aware of every event she is aware of at ω, provided that
this event is based in a space lower than or equal to S (Projections Preserve Awareness).
2.7 Knowledge
Definition 1 The decision maker’s knowledge operator on events E is defined, as usual,
by
K(E) := {ω ∈ Ω : Π(ω) ⊆ E} ,
if there is a state ω such that Π(ω) ⊆ E, and by
K(E) := ∅S(E)
otherwise.
The following two propositions are proved in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006):
Proposition 1 If E is an event, then K(E) is an S(E)-based event.
Proposition 2 The Knowledge operator K has the following properties:
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(i) Necessitation: K(Ω) = Ω,
(ii) Conjunction: K
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
=
⋂
λ∈LK (Eλ),
(iii) Truth: K(E) ⊆ E,
(iv) Positive Introspection: K(E) ⊆ KK(E),
(v) Monotonicity: E ⊆ F implies K(E) ⊆ K(F ),
(vi) ¬K(E) ∩ ¬K¬K(E) ⊆ ¬K¬K¬K(E).
Proposition 2 says that the knowledge operator has all the strong properties of knowl-
edge in partitional information structures, except for the weakening (vi) of the negative
introspection property. Negative introspection – the property ¬K(E) ⊆ K¬K(E) that
when an individual does not know an event, she knows she does not know it – obtains only
when the individual is also aware of the event (see Property 5. of the next proposition).
2.8 Awareness and Unawareness
Definition 2 The decision maker’s awareness operator from events to events is defined
by
A(E) = {ω ∈ Ω : Π(ω) ⊆ S(E)↑}
if there is a state ω such that Π(ω) ⊆ S(E)↑, and by
A(E) = ∅S(E)
otherwise. The unawareness operator is then naturally defined by
U(E) = ¬A(E).
Alternatively, we could follow Modica and Rustichini (1999) in defining the unaware-
ness operator by
U(E) = ¬K(E) ∩ ¬K¬K(E).
Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2008, Remark 6) show that the two definitions are indeed
equivalent. Note that by Proposition 1 and the definition of the negation, we have
A(E) = K(E) ∪K¬K(E).
The following proposition is proved in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2006):
Proposition 3 The following properties of knowledge and awareness obtain:
1. KU Introspection: KU(E) = ∅S(E),
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2. AU Introspection: U(E) = UU(E),
3. Weak Necessitation: A(E) = K
(
S (E)↑
)
,
4. Strong Plausibility: U(E) =
⋂∞
n=1 (¬K)
n (E),
5. Weak Negative Introspection: ¬K(E) ∩A¬K(E) = K¬K(E),
6. Symmetric: A(E) = A(¬E),
7. A-Conjunction:
⋂
λ∈LA (Eλ) = A
(⋂
λ∈LEλ
)
,
8. AK-Self Reflection: A(E) = AK(E),
9. AA-Self Reflection: A(E) = AA(E),
10. A-Introspection: A(E) = KA(E).
Properties 1. to 4. have been proposed by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998),
properties 6. to 9. by Modica and Rustichini (1999), and properties 5. to 9. by
Fagin and Halpern (1988) and Halpern (2001). A-Introspection is the property that an
individual is aware of an event if and only if she knows she is aware of it.
3 Preference-Based Knowledge and Awareness
So far, we just outlined unawareness structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper
(2006, 2008). In this section, we add decision theoretic primitives and characterize the
possibility correspondence, knowledge, awareness and unawareness by choices. As in
Morris (1996, 1997), from now on we restrict ourselves to finite Ω (see also Fn. 7). This
assumption may be defended by the fact that most choice experiments take place in a
finite context.
3.1 Acts
An act is a function f : Ω −→ R, where f(ω) ∈ R can be thought of the money prize at
state ω.
Note that different from Savage acts, f is not defined on just one state-space but on
the union of spaces Ω. This is interpreted as follows: Let’s say an individual considers
investing in a firm (e.g., the act f). A firm can be viewed as a bundle of uncertain oppor-
tunities and liabilities. The decision maker may perceive only a subset of opportunities
and liabilities depending on her awareness level that may be influenced by her prior expe-
rience or her reading of the “fine prints” of the “share sales and purchase agreement”. In
our setting, the opportunities and liabilities are represented by money prizes contingent
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on states, i.e., acts. Some of the opportunities and liabilities (i.e., events) may not be ex-
pressible in some of the spaces in S. That is, they are not perceived when having certain
awareness levels. So an act denotes simultaneously more or less rich descriptions of those
opportunities and liabilities. It is essentially a label of the action “buy the firm”. Which
opportunities and liabilities are perceived by the decision maker, i.e., the awareness level
of the decision maker, will be captured by the preferences over acts introduced below.
For any event E and acts f and g, define a composite act fEg by
fEg(ω) =
{
f(ω) if ω ∈ E
g(ω) otherwise.
Note that different from composite acts in the Savage approach, g is not only prescribed
on the negation of E but also on all states that are neither in E nor in ¬E. Different
from acts defined on a standard state-space, we have in general fEg 6= g¬Ef .
For any collection of pairwise disjoint events E1, E2, ..., En ∈ Σ and acts f
1, f 2, ..., fn, g ∈
A, let f 1E1f
2
E2
...fnEng denote the composite act that yields f
i(ω) if ω ∈ Ei for i = 1, ..., n,
and g(ω) otherwise.
Let A denote the set of all acts.
Note that we do not impose a measurability condition on acts in the sense that for
any f ∈ A and x ∈ R, the set of states {ω ∈ Ω : f(ω) = x} is an event in Σ as defined
previously. While such a measurability assumption may be justified in some applications,
it may not be applicable in general. The speculative trade example in Heifetz, Meier,
and Schipper (2006) is one instance.4 A practical framework of decision making under
unawareness should not rule out such examples.
In the following we will consider also composite acts of the form
f{ω}g(ω
′) =
{
f(ω′) if ω = ω′
g(ω′) otherwise.
Although {ω} may not be an event in the unawareness structure, we still have f{ω}g ∈ A.
To see this note that for every f, g ∈ A we can define an act h ∈ A such that h(ω) = f(ω)
and h(ω′) = g(ω′) for ω′ 6= ω. Then f{ω}g = h{ω}↑g and clearly h{ω}↑g ∈ A.
3.2 Preferences
We follow Morris (1996, 1997) in defining a binary relation % (ω) on acts in A for each
ω ∈ Ω. We assume that for any ω ∈ Ω, % (ω) is a preference relation, i.e., % (ω) is
reflexive, complete, and transitive. That is, at each state the decision maker is assumed
4There, the set of states where the value of the firm is 90 dollars (for instance) in not an event in
the sense of our event structure. Thus, the act “buy the firm” would not satisfy such a measurability
condition. See also Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) and Meier and Schipper (2010) for a detailed
analysis of speculative trade under unawareness.
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to have a preference relation. f % (ω) g means that at state ω, the decision maker prefers
act f over act g.5 Reflexivity means that every act is as good as itself. Completeness
is a strong assumption. It requires that the decision maker can rank any two acts.
Transitivity is sufficient to rule out “money pumps”, i.e., choice cycles along which the
decision maker could be exploited.
As usual, strict preference, ≻ (ω), is defined on A by % (ω) and not - (ω). Indiffer-
ence, ∼ (ω), is defined on A by % (ω) and - (ω).
3.3 Preference-Based Possibility Correspondence
Define a preference-based correspondence Π˜ : Ω −→ 2Ω by
Π˜(ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω : f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A}. (1)
Intuitively, at state ω, a decision maker considers a state ω′ possible if there is a
choice problem for which state ω′ “makes a difference” to the decision maker at state ω.
More precise, there are two acts that are identical except for the state ω′ but the decision
maker is not indifferent between those acts with her preferences in ω.
Our aim is to analyze when Π˜ is a possibility correspondence satisfying properties 0.
to 5. To this extent, we need to consider the following properties on %.
We slightly abuse notation and denote by Sω the space S ∈ S for which ω ∈ S. Since
any two spaces in S are disjoint, Sω is unique, for all ω ∈ Ω.
Property 1 If f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A and Sω′′ 6= Sω′, then f
′
{ω′′}g
′ ∼
(ω) h′{ω′′}g
′ for all f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A.
Property 2 If f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A, then Sω′  Sω.
These two properties characterize Confinement of the preference-based possibility corre-
spondence.
Lemma 1 For all ω ∈ Ω, % (ω) satisfies Properties 1 and 2 if and only if Π˜ satisfies
Confinement.
Close inspection of Confinement reveals that it consists of two properties of the possi-
bility correspondence. First, for each state ω it confines the value of the correspondence
to a single space. Second, it requires that this space is weakly lower than the space Sω.
The proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix reveals that these two features are mimicked by
Properties 1 and 2, respectively.
5Note that f % (ω) g does not necessarily imply that the decision maker would prefer f over g if he
believes that the state is ω.
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Property 1 will play a role also in characterizing other properties of the possibility
correspondence. For instance, whenever we write Π˜↑(ω), we implicitly assume that there
is a well-defined base-space S ⊇ Π˜(ω).
Next we turn to Generalized Reflexivity.
Property 3 f{ωS}g ≻ (ω) h{ωS}g for some S  Sω and some f, g, h ∈ A.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Property 1 holds. For all ω ∈ Ω, % (ω) satisfies Property 3 if
and only if Π˜ satisfies Generalized Reflexivity.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
Morris (1996, Lemma 3) showed that f{ω}g ≻ (ω) h{ω}g for some f, g, h ∈ A and
for all ω ∈ Ω characterizes the truth axiom of knowledge in standard states-space struc-
tures. Property 3 and Lemma 2 should be understood as generalizing this observation
to unawareness structures.
Property 4 If f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A and f
′
{ω′′}g
′ ≻ (ω′) h′{ω′′}g
′ for
some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A, then f ′′{ω′′}g
′′ ≻ (ω) h′′{ω′′}g
′′ for some f ′′, g′′, h′′ ∈ A.
Property 5 If f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A and f
′
{ω′′}g
′ ≻ (ω) h′{ω′′}g
′ for
some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A, then f ′′{ω′′}g
′′ ≻ (ω′) h′′{ω′′}g
′′ for some f ′′, g′′, h′′ ∈ A.
Lemma 3 For all ω ∈ Ω, % (ω) satisfies Properties 4 and 5 if and only if Π˜ satisfies
Stationarity.
Note that Π˜ satisfies stationarity if and only if it satisfies Transitivity (i.e., if ω′ ∈ Π˜(ω)
then Π˜(ω′) ⊆ Π˜(ω)) and Euclideanness (i.e., if ω′ ∈ Π˜(ω) then Π˜(ω′) ⊇ Π˜(ω)). The proof
contained in the appendix verifies that Property 4 is a “translation” of Transitivity and
that Property 5 is a “translation” of Euclideanness.
The next two properties relate preferences across spaces. E.g., they relate a decision
maker’s preference at ω to his preference at the projection to a lower space ωS. The
proofs of the following two lemmata are contained in the appendix.
Property 6 If ω ∈ S ′, S  S ′, and f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A, then there
exists ω′′ ∈ Ω with ω′ ∈ {ω′′}↑ such that f ′{ω′′}g
′ ≻ (ωS) h
′
{ω′′}g
′ for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Property 1 holds. For all ω ∈ Ω, % (ω) satisfies Property 6 if
and only if Π˜ satisfies Projections Preserve Ignorance.
Property 7 If S  Sω′  Sω and f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A, then
f ′{ω′′}g
′ ≻ (ωS) h
′
{ω′′}g
′ for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A if and only if there exists ω′′′ ∈ Sω′ such
that ω′′ = ω′′′S and f
′′
{ω′′′}g
′′ ≻ (ω) h′′{ω′′′}g
′′ for some f ′′, g′′, h′′ ∈ A.
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Lemma 5 Suppose that Property 1 holds. For all ω ∈ Ω, % (ω) satisfies Property 7 if
and only if Π˜ satisfies Projections Preserve Knowledge.
We summarize our observations in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The preference–based correspondence Π˜ is a possibility correspondence
satisfying 0. to 5. if and only if for any ω ∈ Ω the preference order % (ω) satisfies
Properties 1 to 7.
3.4 Preference-Based Knowledge and Awareness
Assume now that for any ω ∈ Ω, % (ω) is a preference relation satisfying Properties 1 to 7.
We now define knowledge, awareness, and unawareness directly in terms of preferences.
Definition 3 The preference-based knowledge operator on Σ is defined by
K˜(E) :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
(i) f¬Eg ∼ (ω) h¬Eg for all f, g, h ∈ A, and
(ii) fEg ≻ (ω) hEg for some f, g, h ∈ A
}
if there is a state ω ∈ Ω such that (i) and (ii) hold, and by K˜(E) := ∅S(E) otherwise.
Property (i) is familiar from the definition of Savage null event (Savage, 1954). An
event E is known if its negation is null. Morris (1996, 1997) defines “standard” knowledge
by this property alone.6 Yet, in unawareness structures it is possible that both the event
and its negation are null, in which case - as we will see below - the decision maker is
unaware of the event. That’s why we need to add the second requirement, property (ii),
to the definition.
Given the possibility correspondence Π˜ and Definition 1, the knowledge operator on
Σ is
K(E) = {ω ∈ Ω : Π˜(ω) ⊆ E}
if there is a state ω ∈ Ω such that Π˜(ω) ⊆ E, and K(E) = ∅S(E) otherwise.
Proposition 5 For any event E ∈ Σ, K˜(E) = K(E).
The proof is contained in the appendix.7
6To be precise, Morris (1996, 1997) defines “Savage belief” by property (i) alone. Since in our context
we impose Property 3 which implies the Truth, we think it is justified to call it knowledge.
7The proof makes use of the assumption that Ω is finite. We were not be able to prove it for more
general Ω without imposing further assumptions. We suspect that this is one of the reasons why Morris
(1996, 1997) assumed Ω to be finite.
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Definition 4 The preference-based awareness operator on Σ is defined by
A˜(E) :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
(ii) fEg ≻ (ω) hEg for some f, g, h ∈ A, or
(iii) f¬Eg ≻ (ω) h¬Eg for some f, g, h ∈ A
}
if there is a state ω ∈ Ω such that (ii) or (iii) hold, and by A˜(E) := ∅S(E) otherwise.
Given the possibility correspondence Π˜ and Definition 2, the decision maker’s aware-
ness operator in Σ is
A(E) =
{
ω ∈ Ω : Π˜(ω) ⊆ S(E)↑
}
if there is a state ω such that Π˜(ω) ⊆ S(E)↑, and A(E) = ∅S(E) otherwise.
Proposition 6 For any event E ∈ Σ, A˜(E) = A(E).
The proof follows from Proposition 5 and Weak Necessitation.
Definition 5 The preference-based unawareness operator on Σ is defined by
U˜(E) :=
{
ω ∈ Ω :
(0) fEg ∼ (ω) hEg for all f, g, h ∈ A, and
(i) f¬Eg ∼ (ω) h¬Eg for all f, g, h ∈ A
}
if there is a state ω ∈ Ω such that (0) and (i) hold, and by U˜(E) := ∅S(E) otherwise.
This behavioral definition of unawareness means that a decision maker is unaware of
an event if this event is null and the negation of the event is null.8 Indeed, this behavioral
definition of unawareness is equivalent to the epistemic notion of unawareness.
Corollary 1 For any event E ∈ Σ, U˜(E) = U(E).
Note that we are able to characterize all epistemic operators by conjunction and
disjunction of choices experiments corresponding to properties (0) to (iii) in Definitions 3
to 5.
4 Discussion
In what sense do our results really provide a behavioral characterization of properties
of the possibility correspondence, knowledge, awareness, and unawareness? First note
that in order to “reveal” whether a decision maker’s possibility correspondence satisfies
properties 0. to 5., many counterfactual choice experiments have to be performed. For
8This condition characterizes behaviorally unawareness in Schipper (2012) using a states-of-nature
lattice structure and the Anscombe-Aumann approach.
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instance, we first may have to conduct choice experiments at a state ω at which the
decision maker may be unaware of both events E and F . Then we may have to consider
choice experiments at a state ω′, at which the decision maker may be aware of E but
unaware of F , and then at yet another state ω′′ at which he is unaware of E but aware of F
etc. But how should this be practically done? If these choice experiments are conducted
sequentially, then it requires that after becoming aware of the E the decision maker
must become unaware of E before we can conduct the last set of choice experiments.9
More natural is the interpretation of the model as the belief of another player (or the
modeler) about the decision maker’s choices at various states. While this interpretation
may appear unusual at a first glance, we would argue that it corresponds rather closely
to the actual treatment of decision theoretic models by decision theorists. Despite the
emphasis on preferences revealed by choices, most decision theorists chose not to conduct
choice experiments and many choice theoretic “axioms” are just of technical nature (e.g.,
continuity axioms) or impractical to implement in actual choice experiments (e.g., axioms
on conditional preferences). Such “axioms” are testable just in “principle”. That is, they
represent the belief of the modeler about how a decision maker would perform in certain
choice experiments when he is ascribed a certain utility representation.10
Our analysis is subject to another caveat raised previously in Schipper (2012). Prop-
erty 1 implies that the events of which the decision maker is unaware of do not affect
her ranking of acts. This holds even for composite acts conditioned on events that the
decision maker is unaware of. More generally, it rules out that a decision maker becomes
aware of an event merely from facing an act. This is also the implicit assumption in stan-
dard decision theory (i.e., different acts do not change the subset of “small worlds” that
a decision maker pays attention to). Yet, there it is less problematic since there is just
one set of “small worlds”. But it may be unrealistic in some situations with unawareness.
Sometimes, when facing an act, a decision maker may become in very subtle ways a bit
more careful with the “fine prints” of acts, and this care may lead her to become aware
of events. E.g., a buyer facing a decision about whether or not to enter into a certain
purchase contract may become aware of events that she was previously unaware of when
reading all the fine prints of the contract. If ex ante an outside observer does not know
how acts affect the awareness of a decision maker, then it may be impossible to design
choice experiments required to elicit properties of the static possibility correspondence.
Our analysis differs from the one presented in Schipper (2012) in several aspects. First,
we mentioned already that Schipper (2012) considers states of nature while we consider
states of the world. Latter approach allows us to talk about knowledge of knowledge etc.
9Another difficulty that this model shares with Morris (1996, 1997) is how to phrase practically bets
on events corresponding to (even higher order) beliefs of some events.
10Our interpretation of the decision theoretic model is also reminiscent of the interpretation of the
notion of strategy in extensive-form games. As Rubinstein (1991) pointed out, an action prescribed by
a strategy at an information set which is excluded by an earlier move of that very strategy is implicitly
interpreted in game theory as the beliefs that the other players entertain regarding the player’s move if
that information set were reached.
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Second, while Schipper (2012) considers Anscombe-Aumann acts, i.e., mappings from
states to mixtures over outcomes, we consider here real-valued Savage acts, i.e., mappings
from states to real numbers. Third, Schipper (2012) aims at subjective expected utility
representation theorems with probabilistic beliefs while we focus on characterizing the
qualitative notions of knowledge, awareness, and unawareness. Our analysis is related to
Li (2008) who seeks to study the difference between unawareness and zero probability as
well.
Morris (1996) also related dynamic preferences to properties of belief change. Dy-
namic unawareness has been analyzed in epistemic frameworks (van Dittmarsch and
French 2009, 2011a, b, Hill, 2010), in game theoretic settings (Feinberg, 2012, Grant and
Quiggin, 2013, Halpern and Reˆgo, 2012b, Reˆgo and Halpern, 2012, Heifetz, Meier, and
Schipper, 2011a, b, Li, 2006, Meier and Schipper, 2011), and more recently also in a
decision theoretic framework by Karni and Vierø (2013). The latter approach is confined
to states of nature, i.e., the beliefs of the decision maker are not part of the description
of the state. We leave a decision theoretic analysis of dynamic unawareness with states
of the world analogous to Morris (1996) to future research.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
“⇒”: Suppose there exists S ∈ S and ω ∈ S such that Π˜(ω) ⊆ S ′ with S ′  S. Then
for ω′ ∈ Π˜(ω) we have f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A. But Property 2 implies
Sω′  Sω. Note that S
′ = Sω′ , a contradiction.
Suppose now that there exists S ∈ S and ω ∈ S such that Π˜(ω) * S ′, for all S ′ ∈ S.
Then there exist ω′, ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω) such that Sω′ 6= Sω′′ . If ω
′ ∈ Π˜(ω) then by Property 1
we have f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A and for any ω
′′ 6= ω′ with Sω′′ 6= Sω′ ,
f ′{ω′′}g
′ ∼ (ω) h′{ω′′}g
′ for all f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A. Hence ω′′ /∈ Π˜(ω), a contradiction.
“⇐”: Suppose there exist ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such that Property 1 is violated, i.e., f{ω′}g ≻
(ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A, Sω′′ 6= Sω′ , and f
′
{ω′′}g
′ ≁ (ω) h′{ω′′}g
′ for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈
A. Then ω′, ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω), a contradiction to Π˜(ω) ⊆ S ′ for some S ′ ∈ S.
Suppose there exist ω, ω′, ω′′ ∈ Ω such that Property 2 is violated, i.e., f{ω′}g ≻
(ω)h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A and Sω′  Sω. Then by previous arguments Π˜(ω) ⊆ S ′
with S ′ = Sω′  Sω = S, a contradiction of Confinement. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
“⇐”: Suppose by contradiction that f{ωS}g ∼ (ω) h{ωS} for all S  Sω and all f, g, h ∈ A.
Thus, rSωS (ω) /∈ Π˜(ω) for all S  Sω, a contradiction.
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“⇒”: Suppose f{ωS}g ≻ (ω) h{ωS}g for some S  Sω and some f, g, h ∈ A. Thus,
ωS ∈ Π˜(ω). Property 1 implies Π˜(ω) ⊆ S. Thus, Π
↑(ω) is well-defined and we conclude
that ω ∈ Π˜↑(ω). 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We first prove that Transitivity is equivalent to Property 4: f{ω′′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′′}g for
some f, g, h ∈ A if and only if ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω). f ′{ω′}g
′ ≻ (ω) h′{ω′}g
′ for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A
if and only if ω′ ∈ Π˜(ω). f ′′{ω′′}g
′′ ≻ (ω′) h′′{ω′′}g
′′ for some f ′′, g′′, h′′ ∈ A if and only
if ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω′). Thus, Property 4 is equivalent to if ω′ ∈ Π˜(ω) and ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω′), then
ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω). This is equivalent to Transitivity.
Second, we prove that Euclideanness is equivalent to Property 5: f{ω′′}g ≻ (ω
′) h{ω′′}g
for some f, g, h ∈ A if and only if ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω′). f ′{ω′}g
′ ≻ (ω) h′{ω′}g
′ for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A
if and only if ω′ ∈ Π˜(ω). f ′′{ω′′}g
′′ ≻ (ω) h′′{ω′′}g
′′ for some f ′′, g′′, h′′ ∈ A if and only
if ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω). Thus, Property 5 is equivalent to if ω′ ∈ Π˜(ω) and ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω), then
ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ω′). This is equivalent to Euclideanness. 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
“⇒”: If f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A, then ω
′ ∈ Π˜(ω). If f ′{ω′′}g
′ ≻ (ωS) h
′
{ω′′}g
′
for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A, then ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ωS). Moreover, according to Property 6, ω
′ ∈ {ω′′}↑.
From Property 1 follows that Π˜↑(ω) and Π˜↑(ωS) are well-defined. Thus ω
′ ∈ Π˜↑(ωS) and
it follows that Π˜↑(ω) ⊆ Π˜↑(ωS).
“⇐”: ω′ ∈ Π˜(ω) if and only if f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A. Since
ω′ ∈ Π˜↑(ωS), by Projections Preserve Ignorance there exists ω
′′ ∈ Π˜(ωS) such that
ω′ ∈ {ω′′}↑. Moreover, f ′{ω′′}g
′ ≻ (ωS) h
′
{ω′′}g
′ for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A 
A.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Let S  Sω′  Sω. By Property 1, f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A if and
only if Π˜(ω) ⊆ Sω′ . Thus, the hypotheses of both Projections Preserve Knowledge and
Property 7 are equivalent under Property 1.
f ′{ω′′}g
′ ≻ (ωS) h
′
{ω′′}g
′ for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A if and only if ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ωS).
f ′′{ω′′′}g
′′ ≻ (ω) h′′{ω′′′}g
′′ for some f ′′, g′′, h′′ ∈ A if and only if ω′′′ ∈ Π˜(ω).
Thus, the conclusion of Property 7 is equivalent to: ω′′ ∈ Π˜(ωS) if and only there
exists a state ω′′′ ∈ Sω′ such that ω
′′ = ω′′′S and ω
′′′ ∈ Π˜(ω). This is equivalent to
Π˜(ωS) = (Π˜(ω))S, the conclusion of Projections Preserve Knowledge. 
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
“⊇”: ω ∈ K(E) if and only if Π˜(ω) ⊆ E. It follows that f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some
f, g, h ∈ A implies ω′ ∈ E. Define
f ′(ω) =
{
f(ω) if ω = ω′
g(ω) if ω 6= ω′
h′(ω) =
{
h(ω) if ω = ω′
g(ω) if ω 6= ω′
and g′ = g. Note that f ′, h′, g′ ∈ A. Then from f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A
implies ω′ ∈ E follows that f ′Eg
′ ≻ (ω) h′Eg
′ for some f ′, g′, h′ ∈ A, yielding property (ii).
Note that property (i) in the definition of K˜ holds trivially if E = S(E)↑. Assume E $
S(E)↑. From Π˜(ω) ⊆ E follows that ω′ ∈ ¬E implies ω′ /∈ Π˜(ω). Thus f{ω′}g ∼ (ω) h{ω′}g
for all f, g, h ∈ A. Since Ω is finite, we can enumerate all states in ¬E from lets say 1 to n.
Then for any f, g, h we have f{ω1}g ∼ (ω) f{ω1,ω2}g ∼ (ω) ... ∼ (ω) f{ω1,ω2,...,ωn}g = f¬Eg
as well as h{ω1}g ∼ (ω) h{ω1,ω2}g ∼ (ω) ... ∼ (ω) h{ω1,ω2,...,ωn}g = h¬Eg and thus by
transitivity of  (ω) also f¬Eg ∼ (ω) h¬Eg, yielding property (i) of the definition of K˜.
Hence ω ∈ K˜(E).
“⊆”: ω ∈ K˜(E) if and only if (i) f¬Eg ∼ (ω) h¬Eg for all f, g, h ∈ A, and (ii)
fEg ≻ (ω) hEg for some f, g, h ∈ A. Consider first (i). For any ω
′ ∈ ¬E, arguments
made above imply f{ω′}g ∼ (ω) h{ω′}g for all f, g, h ∈ A if we let ω
′ = ω1. It follows that
Π˜(ω) ∩ ¬E = ∅.
Consider now property (ii) of the definition of K˜. We claim that for some ω′ ∈ E,
f{ω′}g ≻ (ω) h{ω′}g for some f, g, h ∈ A. Suppose to the contrary that f{ω′}g ∼ (ω) h{ω′}g
for all f, g, h ∈ A and all ω′ ∈ E. Since Ω is finite, we can enumerate states in E from lets
say 1 to m. Previous arguments imply fEg ∼ (ω) hEg for all f, g, h ∈ A, a contradiction
to property (ii). Thus Π˜(ω) ⊆ E which is equivalent to ω ∈ K(E). 
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